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Abstract 
In this introduction to the special issue ‘Changing work, labour and 
employment relations in China’, we argue that China is taking an 
experimental and decentralized approach to the development of new 
labor relations frameworks. Particular political constraints in China 
prevent interest aggregation among workers, as the central state sees 
this as posing a risk to social stability. Firms and local governments 
have been given a degree of space to experiment with different 
arrangements, as long as the categorical ban on independent unions is 
not violated. The consequence has been an increasingly differentiated 
labor relations landscape, with significant variation by region and 
sector. We note some countervailing tendencies towards re-
centralization, but emphasize that this phenomenon remains largely 
confined to the municipal level. The five articles in this special issue 
address different aspects of both experimentation and decentralization 
in labor relations. 
Keywords: China, collective bargaining, labor relations, strikes, unions 
The changes in work, labor and employment relations in China that are 
the subject of this special issue must be viewed against the broader context of 
 economic reform. Over the past 35 years, China’s approach to economic 
reform has been marked by a high degree of experimentation and 
decentralization. As has been well established in the literature, China began 
moving away from central planning of the economy in the late 1970s, and 
allowed for a variety of initiatives with market reforms to develop in the 
provinces. This resulted in experiments with decollectivization of land (Unger, 
2002), the emergence of market- oriented but collectively owned ‘town and 
village enterprises’ (Naughton, 1994; Walder, 1995), fully private firms (Liu, 
1992; Nee and Opper, 2012; Tsai, 2007), and spatially circumscribed special 
economic zones. If regions proved successful, their ‘models’ could be promoted 
throughout the country. The central state has proven willing to relinquish quite 
a bit of control over local governments during this process, as long as such 
autonomy is oriented towards increasing economic growth. The consequence 
is that China’s economy has become increasingly differentiated throughout the 
reform era. 
Our argument is that the state is taking a similarly experimental, 
gradualist and decentralized approach to reform of the system of labor 
relations. Perhaps there is nothing surprising about this. Indeed, highly 
differentiated labor relations institutions would seem to be the corollary of a 
highly differentiated economy. A unified approach would be unable to 
accommodate the requirements of a hugely diverse set of employment 
relations that vary widely by region, sector, workforce composition and form of 
ownership. And yet there is a key distinction with the process of economic 
reform: on the one hand, decentralization of economic decision-making has 
created a space where private capital is meaningfully autonomous from the 
central state - if, importantly, remaining deeply integrated with local 
 governments. Private firms (both domestic and foreign) are not integrated into 
a hierarchical organization that extends all the way to Beijing.1 On the other 
hand, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) - the only legal repre-
sentative of labor - is integrated into a hierarchical national organization. The 
ACFTU is formally subordinate to the Communist Party and has long been used 
by the state as an instrument of ensuring political control in the workplace. The 
central government is keen to allow for experimentation in labor relations (the 
ACFTU, for example, has been asked to organize all workplaces and to bargain 
collectively in order to contain industrial unrest), but with the important 
proviso that independent forms of worker organization are banned. In this 
sense, labor relations reform has proceeded, but it faces greater constraints 
than has been the case with economic reform. It is within this political frame-
work that employers, unions and governments largely at the municipal level 
have been trying new approaches to regulating employment. Thus, whereas 
capital has been granted meaningful autonomy, labor at the local level 
continues to operate with constrained autonomy. The consequence of this 
asymmetric politics is that diverse efforts to rationalize employment relations 
have rarely been successful. 
Finding a new approach to regulating employment is an increasingly 
pressing issue from the perspective of the central government. Politically, 
worker unrest has been growing for many years (Chan, 2010; Chan and Pun, 
2009). Although numerous wildcat strikes, road blockages and occasional riots 
do not yet represent a major challenge to political stability (Lee, 2007), the 
state has been unable to reduce ‘depoliticized’ worker insurgency (Friedman, 
2014b). Reform in employment relations is also necessary for economic 
reasons. At the level of the firm, incredibly high rates of turnover and severe 
 labor shortages have come to be one of the key limits on future growth. The 
inability to retain a stable workforce has pushed employers in the industrial 
centers in coastal areas to look further afield - either to China’s interior or 
overseas (Zhu and Pickles, 2014). At the national level, the central state has 
espoused the goal of economic rebalancing, that is, making household 
consumption, rather than state-driven investment, the key engine of economic 
growth. China’s household consumption as a share of GDP is only 38 percent, 
compared with the USA, which clocks in at 70 percent and is significantly less 
than the approximately 60 percent in countries such as Brazil, France, Germany 
and India. Such a rebalancing involves major policy challenges in a number of 
arenas, including higher wages and an expansion of social services, both of 
which are likely necessary to foster increased domestic consumption (Chamon 
and Prasad, 2010). In other countries, particularly the USA, a rationalization of 
employment relations played a key role in the movement from unregulated 
capitalism to a Fordist model of high consumption. These factors explain the 
central state’s granting of constrained autonomy to experiment with labor 
relations reforms. 
Each of the articles in this special issue addresses a different aspect of 
labor relations in China. In so doing, they make important contributions to our 
overall argument about experimentation and decentralization in employment 
relations and regulation in China. We briefly introduce the articles below and 
will subsequently integrate their findings into building our argument. 
Gallagher et al.’s article (2014; this issue) focuses on the government’s 
efforts in the legal arena, particularly with respect to labor law. They find that 
although the government and local labor bureaus are increasingly concerned 
with enforcement of the 2008 Labor Contract Law, there is substantial 
 variation in actual enforcement across regions and across different provisions 
of the law. In his article, Chung (2014; this issue) tries to explain why there are 
differences in enforcement of different legal provisions by highlighting that 
successful enforcement is a function of both top-down as well as bottom-up 
pressure from a variety of social actors, whose interests diverge on different 
aspects of the law. Compliance is better, he argues, when the interests of 
different actors converge. Variation in enforcement is one significant aspect of 
the decentralization that is one of the core arguments of this article. Frenkel 
and Yu (2014; this issue) highlight how young workers are increasingly aware of 
their legal rights, and hence constitute some pressure for better enforcement, 
but also to increased labor unrest. Finally, in the absence of an effective labor 
relations framework in many places, managers have been taking matters into 
their own hands. Although representing very different sorts of approaches, 
both the ‘humanized management’ discussed by Choi and Peng (2014; this 
issue) and the unfree labor of student interns in Smith and Chan’s (2014; this 
issue) article are unilateral responses by management to ongoing instability. 
This introduction provides an overview of the development of labor 
relations in China to serve as a framework for understanding these important 
contributions. Additionally, we will discuss some developments that have not 
been covered. Particularly notable is that none of our contributions pay 
significant attention to the trade union or recent collective bargaining 
initiatives (which figure prominently in our introduction). Although there have 
been some important developments in this realm, most scholars remain pes-
simistic about the capacity of the ACFTU given its fundamental weakness. 
Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that different models of trade union activity have 
proliferated around the country, and there is certainly important diversity. 
 Below, we outline the diversity of reforms that employers, unions, local 
governments and civil society actors are pursuing in contemporary China. After 
a brief overview of the primary sources of employment instability in China, we 
will proceed to analyze three spheres of reform: (i) legal, (ii) unions and 
collective bargaining and (iii) managerial strategy. In each section we will draw 
on the articles in this special issue, highlighting the ways in which they demon-
strate the experimentation and decentralization that have been the hallmarks 
of labor relations reform in China. 
Labor market instability 
The Chinese labor market, characterized by significant oversupply 
during the 1990s, is currently witnessing unprecedented instability, with acute 
labor shortages, rising industrial conflict and high levels of turnover. 
Labor shortages 
A key change during the decade of the 2000s has been the transition 
from a labor surplus economy to one dominated by labor shortages (Golley and 
Meng, 2011). As the market economy expanded in the 1980s, private 
employers in coastal regions enjoyed a seemingly limitless supply of low-cost 
migrant labor. However, by the late 2000s, it became clear that a structural 
shift in the labor market was under way. As early as 2004, employers along the 
coast had begun to report shortages. Although 20 million migrants in the 
export-processing sector were thrown out of work by the economic crisis in 
2008, tight labor markets re-emerged almost immediately thereafter. The 
emergence of labor shortages in rapidly growing inland regions provides 
further evidence that a structural shift is developing.2 
A number of reasons have been advanced for this labor scarcity. First, 
 and obviously, shortages are a function of the rapid growth of the Chinese 
economy. However, arguably the seeds of the shortage were planted much 
earlier by China’s birth control policy, which has reduced the number of people 
entering the labor market. In addition, there has been a major expansion of 
tertiary education, so more young people are choosing to go to college rather 
than into factories. Ma and Adams (2013) note that the number of people 
enrolling in higher education programs increased from 2.2 million in 2000 to 
over 6.6 million in 2010. A further explanation is the stated preference of 
employers for young migrant workers rather than older ones (Ma and Adams, 
2013). 
An important cause of the labor shortage is reflected in the differences 
between the younger generation of rural migrant workers and earlier 
generations. Young migrant workers are not only better educated and no 
longer satisfied with menial labor, few having worked on a farm, but they are 
also motivated more by their own career advancement and individual interests. 
This is in marked contrast to the first generation of migrant workers, who 
typically saw their time in the city as a brief interlude to save some money 
before returning to the village. What is more, younger migrants put a premium 
on social justice and fair treatment, which the Chinese government’s extensive 
legislative changes that protect and increase workers’ rights (described below) 
have facilitated to no small extent. As such, when confronted with the 
sweatshop conditions of standard factory work, this new generation tends to 
‘vote with their feet’, or they are more inclined to raise disputes or engage in 
strike activity. Frenkel and Yu (2014; this issue) persuasively argue that the new 
generation of migrant workers can no longer be described as members of an 
‘underclass’ and are not significantly different in their work orientation and 
 strategies for work-life improvement than regular workers. 
Yet another reason for the labor shortage has been the 
institutionalized discrimination against migrant workers as a result of the 
hukou system (the system of household registration originally introduced by 
the Communist Party in 1958 to regulate movement of people between rural 
and urban areas). Given that migrant workers who work outside their hukou 
area do not automatically qualify for a range of benefits, they are less likely to 
work in the cities, and more likely to seek work in their home provinces. This is 
especially true given recent reforms to agriculture that provide an incentive to 
move back (Zhan and Huang, 2013), as well as the movement of employers 
from the coastal cities to more inland locations in search of cheap and less 
scarce labor. 
The net impact of this demographic shift from labor surplus to labor 
scarcity is a steady decline in China’s working age population. According to the 
Chinese National Bureau of Statistics, the working age population was 972 
million in 2012, a decrease of 3.45 million over the previous year. And it is 
predicted that this number will decline to 870 million by 2050. The core group 
of industrial workers (ages 25-39), born during the middle of the one child 
policy, will decrease even more rapidly. Das and N’Diaye (2013) estimate that 
China’s excess supply of labor peaked in 2010 (after the financial crisis) and has 
declined rapidly since then, suggesting that China will reach the Lewisian turn-
ing point by 2020 (Das and N’Diaye, 2013). 
In the short run, as Gallagher (2012) argues, the labor shortage has 
created volatility in the labor market, and enlarged the economic and political 
space for Chinese workers. On the one hand, it has increased their bargaining 
power, and workers have increasingly resorted to strikes and protests. On the 
 other hand, workers are more likely to move from company to company in 
search of better wages and working conditions, resulting in high attrition. And 
rising worker protests have motivated the state to enact more protective labor 
legislation. We turn to these two issues in turn. 
Attrition 
The labor shortage is reflected in increased attrition, as workers use 
‘exit’ in the absence of adequate ‘voice’ mechanisms. Although turnover rates 
vary across different sectors and industries, the average national turnover rate 
is about 20 percent (Wong, 2011). The range is much larger, however. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that attrition is a severe problem in private 
export-oriented firms, whereas state-owned enterprises (SOEs) maintain a 
relatively stable workforce. 
Voluntary attrition has a number of causes. Job-induced physical stress 
and injuries are a significant reason why people leave their jobs, and the 
working conditions and long hours at China’s sweatshops are well documented 
in the literature. Mandatory overtime has also been cited as a reason for 
turnover, although migrant workers are frequently willing to work overtime 
given the low base wages and lack of alternative ways to spend time in factory 
dormitories. As the effects of the labor shortage are felt, manufacturers are 
increasingly demanding excessive overtime hours to meet production targets, 
which workers are increasingly refusing. In addition to long hours, low wages 
and wage arrears are also significant drivers of turnover. Although minimum 
wages have risen steadily since 2004, many employers have not been paying 
the minimum stipulated in provincial legislation, and the problem of unpaid 
wages continues. Dangerous or unhealthy working conditions, the poor quality 
of factory dormitories and meals, and the high rents of factory-subsidized 
 housing further spur workers to vote with their feet. Many authors (e.g. 
Elfstrom and Kuruvilla, 2014) highlight increased worker intolerance of the 
autocratic and ‘militaristic’ management practices of Chinese manufacturing, 
and the need for better treatment and respect from management. The 
institutionalized discrimination against migrant workers via the hukou is also a 
key cause of attrition. The inability to get benefits at their place of employment 
means that workers who wish to have a family are often forced to return to the 
village. Also, workers with rural hukou are more likely to be employed as 
temporary workers. 
The high levels of worker turnover in China are clearly exacerbated by 
the labor shortage. Workers are aware that alternative employment 
opportunities are abundant and are willing to use exit for even minor changes 
in working conditions and wages. Clearly, attrition is a key issue for employers. 
In a survey of manufacturers from Shanghai, 34 percent cite poor employee 
retention as the top issue in 2007 and 2008. Elfstrom and Kuruvilla (2014) 
report an interview from an apparel manufacturer who notes ‘turnover has 
increased to 20 percent from zero “back in the day”’. The instability caused by 
such high levels of turnover can be quite disastrous for employers. Okudera 
(2011) reported an unexceptional experience from the Pearl River Delta: 
At an electronic parts factory in Dongguan, Guangdong province, 
operated by a Japanese company, more than half of the workers quit 
within six months. The factory has to hire about 400 new workers 
every month to maintain a workforce of 4,200. 
Thus, labor shortages and attrition cause substantial labor market instability, 
but instability is also increased by labor unrest, to which we turn to next. 
 Industrial conflict 
Industrial conflict has been rising. So-called ‘mass incidents’ (public 
protests about a variety of issues, including, but not limited to, labor issues) 
have risen steadily from 9000 in 1994 to 87,000 in 2005, the last time the 
government released such figures. The government does not publish statistics 
about employment-related strikes. Most current estimates are drawn from 
news reports or independent reports by activists, and hence are not 
completely reliable, but such data are indicative of protest trends. Elfstrom and 
Kuruvilla (2014) report 435 industrial actions between January 2008 and 31 
March 2012. They find that strikes and protests by workers are distributed 
throughout China, that there have been several well publicized strike ‘waves’ 
that suggest some degree of coordination, and that strikes are more common 
at foreign-owned companies. Given their method of data collection, their 
estimates of the numbers of strikes are at best a gross under-estimate of the 
true picture. Their data, however, are consistent with data reported by China 
Labour Bulletin (a Hong Kong-based non-governmental organization [NGO]). 
Elfstrom and Kuruvilla argue that there has been a change in the 
causes of strikes in China. Whereas prior literature noted that strikes were 
largely ‘defensive’ in nature (to uphold existing rights and benefits), they find 
that strikes are increasingly ‘offensive’, that is, for improvements in pay, 
working conditions and increased respect in the workplace. For example, 102 
out of 435 strikes were for increased wages and benefits. The huge strike at 
Yue Yuen in April 2014 indicates that migrant workers have moved beyond 
simple wage demands and are increasingly concerned with social insurance 
(including pensions). This is a significant departure from just a few years ago. 
It is important to put worker strikes in a larger context, that is, they are 
 part of a general increase in worker militancy and wider variation in worker 
tactics. Thus, workers use ‘exit’ as opposed to ‘voice’, and engage in everyday 
acts of resistance such as ‘shirking’ or ‘holding back’, as well as increased 
aggression and violence. Workers continue to take advantage of legal options 
through the dispute settlement process and, particularly in the Pearl River 
Delta, they increasingly rely on emergent institutions such as labor NGOs. In 
contrast to Lee’s (2007) characterization of early Chinese protests as being 
strikes of desperation (by state-owned workers who have lost their jobs) and 
protests of discrimination (by migrant workers who work under sweatshop 
conditions without benefits), Elfstrom and Kuruvilla suggest that the current 
generation of strikes indicate that workers are using their improved bargaining 
position to go on the offensive. 
Why has worker militancy increased? Certainly, pervasive labor 
shortages have increased workers’ leverage, and workers are now more aware 
of their rights. Although local governments continue to view strikes with 
hostility, and frequently resort to coercion, higher levels of the state may be 
somewhat more supportive. Rising wages and increased domestic consumption 
is in line with the central government’s wishes to ‘rebalance’ the economy, so 
they may provide tacit support (e.g. by allowing media coverage to continue) if 
workers can capture their attention. Finally, there may be a learning process at 
work in which younger workers see that striking is the most effective way to 
have their grievances addressed. 
Legal experiments 
In this context of labor shortages, rising expectations of migrant 
workers and increased disputes, strikes and protests, the Chinese state has 
enacted several new laws that seek to strengthen individual worker rights, 
 enhance employment security, reduce informal employment and widen access 
to social insurance. A number of new laws have been put in place since 2008, 
including the Labor Contract Law (2008), the Labor Dispute Mediation and 
Arbitration Law (2008), the Employment Promotion Law (2008) and the Social 
Insurance Law (2011). Gallagher et al. (2014; this issue) describe the various 
provisions of the laws, and argue that China’s labor regulations would now 
rank third amongst the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries in terms of Employment Protection Legislation 
‘strictness’. What is notable about these legislative efforts is that, by and large, 
they endow workers with an increasing array of individual rights in the absence 
of collective rights - necessarily implying a high degree of decentralization in 
implementation. 
Gallagher et al. (2014; this issue) argue that these laws have improved 
several aspects of employment relations in China. They document a significant 
increase in formal employment, with more workers now having written 
contracts, although there is variation across provinces and between urban and 
migrant workers. Increased formality in employment has also increased access 
to social insurance generally, although access remains a major problem for 
migrant workers. Whereas pension insurance coverage for urban workers 
increased to 88.5 percent, it was only 22.2 percent for migrant workers. This, 
they argue, is largely owing to the hukou policy, that is, migrant workers 
themselves do not wish to participate in social insurance schemes from which 
they themselves will not benefit, given concerns about portability. However, 
the recent Yue Yuen strike suggests that there are a significant number of 
employers that are reluctant to provide social insurance even if migrant 
workers demand it. 
 Yet, despite the positive impact the law has had for some workers, 
there is major variation across region and sector, and widespread violations 
remain. Enforcement is highly decentralized, and local administrations have re-
written or passed regulations, a process Kuruvilla et al. (2011) term 
‘loopholization’, in order to attract foreign investment and enhance local 
competitiveness. Employers have evaded the law through the use of labor 
dispatch agencies, that is, through labor subcontracting. Although the 
government has recently revised the Labor Contract Law to close this loophole 
via restricting the use of ‘dispatched’ or ‘agency’ labor to only 10 percent of the 
workforce, it is likely that compliance will continue to be uneven. 
There are some areas in which enforcement has been somewhat more 
effective. Chung (2014; this issue) points to the importance of non-state actors 
such as labor NGOs, legal aid centers and other social organizations in the 
enforcement of labor law. His argument is that a bottom-up approach to labor 
law enforcement, with workers and non-state actors working together, is more 
effective than the traditional top-down method, but if NGOs are key actors in 
the multi-stakeholder approach that he identifies, there will continue to be 
major geographic unevenness. NGOs are highly concentrated in the Pearl River 
Delta, with a smaller number in the Yangzi River Delta and Beijing. Such a 
bottom-up approach to enforcement is necessarily highly decentralized, as 
labor NGOs are subject to extremely constrained autonomy and are not 
allowed to organize nationally (Franceschini, 2014). To the extent that civil 
society plays a role in setting labor standards, we will likely see increased 
diversification of conditions. 
Although much attention has focused on national-level laws, provinces 
and municipalities have also been experimenting with a variety of 
 arrangements. As was the case with marketization in the 1970s and 1980s, 
Guangdong province has been the most experimental. The ‘Regulations on 
Democratic Management’ were first drafted in 2008, then shelved as a result of 
the economic crisis, and finally resuscitated in the wake of a major strike wave 
in the summer of 2010. The regulations would have created a system for 
workers to demand collective negotiations and to elect their own 
representatives. However, after facing fierce resistance from the Hong Kong 
Chamber of Commerce, the draft regulations were once again shelved. In late 
2013, Guangdong proposed a somewhat different legal framework for 
collective negotiations. This time, however, the conditions were less favorable 
to workers. Labor NGOs and scholars were almost unanimously opposed to the 
draft regulations, as many feared it would result in criminalization of strike 
activity that had become somewhat tolerated. Employers, too, expressed 
opposition out of concern that employees would put forth excessive demands 
in collective negotiations. At the time of final writing (October 2014), a revised 
version of the law has just been published. The law requires employers to 
accept collective negotiations if demanded by more than half of the workforce. 
However, concerns remain about whether enterprise unions will be able to 
effectively represent workers. 
Given that Guangdong has experienced severe instability in labor 
relations, it is likely that the province will continue experimenting with 
institutional responses. Although the central government has been tolerant, it 
seems unlikely that they will be able to contain basic rights such as collective 
bargaining and legal strikes to specific provinces in the long term given the high 
mobility of migrant workers. 
 Collective bargaining experiments 
In recent years, trade unions have made major efforts to move beyond 
a strictly welfarist function (Yang, 2013) to try to represent workers in 
collective negotiations. As collective negotiation has received greater support 
from the central state and national union leadership, there has been a 
continuous effort to ensure a high level of decentralization. The ACFTU has 
consciously undermined the power of the nationally organized industrial 
unions in favor of regionally based federations. Because industrial unions do 
not mirror the Party structure, the fear is that if given greater leeway in 
representing workers, they could serve as a potential independent base of 
political power and would therefore threaten stability. Thus, most 
experimentation with collective negotiation has been at the firm level. 
Increased experimentation with sectoral bargaining has emerged, but it has 
been almost entirely restricted to the municipal level (see below for a notable 
exception). Also, negotiations have been largely restricted to wages, with 
issues such as benefits, hours, seniority structures, workplace rules and other 
topics still determined unilaterally by management. 
As with all economic endeavors in China, local governments have 
played a major role in promoting collective negotiation. Although in many 
places this has been restricted to cliched rhetoric about ‘harmonious labor 
relations’, some governments have been more active. One recent example 
comes from the Binhai New District in Tianjin, where the district government 
has provided material incentives to private firms. Since 2011, firms have been 
able to receive a subsidy equivalent to 15 percent of the total increase in wage 
bill that comes about through collective negotiation (Gongren Ribao, 2013). 
The government has provided subsidies to more than 1000 firms employing 
 nearly 300,000 workers. Although this approach is still exceptional, it suggests 
a possible alternative for local governments looking to raise wages outside of 
the crude lever of minimum wage regulations. 
Frequently the most effective collective negotiations come as an ad 
hoc response to wildcat strikes. As is well known, there are no independent 
unions or right to strike in China, so management frequently has little incentive 
to take negotiations seriously. But in the wake of autonomous worker-led 
strikes, these dynamics change, and the union often intervenes as an 
intermediary to negotiate a settlement (Chen, 2010). This was particularly 
apparent during the major strike wave in the auto industry in 2010 (Butollo and 
ten Brink, 2012). Although serious concerns remain about the sustainability of 
bargaining arrangements, there was greater space for successive rounds of 
wage negotiations in some of the firms that experienced strikes, particularly 
the heavily publicized 
Nanhai Honda plant (Chan and Hui, 2012; Friedman, 2013). Given that 
there is no right to strike in China, this approach to collective negotiation will 
necessarily remain reactive, ad-hoc and highly localized. 
Although decentralization has been the unmistakable trend over the 
past 30 years, recently there have been some countervailing tendencies 
towards modest centralization. This has been particularly apparent in the 
sanitation industry in Guangzhou, which after being radically marketized and 
decentralized after WTO entry in 2001 experienced ongoing strike waves 
(Friedman, 2014a). Another highly publicized effort in Wuhan led to city-wide 
bargaining in the food and beverage industry, and the final agreement claimed 
to cover 450,000 employees. Even more surprising, in early 2014 the Financial, 
Commercial, Light Industry, Textile and Tobacco Workers’ Union, China Cuisine 
 Association and China Hotel Association announced they had successfully 
negotiated the ‘2014 Food and Beverage Industry Wage and Benefits 
Guidelines’. This was the first time such an agreement was reached at the 
national level, and it included guidelines for base wages, wage increases, 
benefits and job training, in theory covering 22 million employees (Gongren 
Ribao, 28 January 2014). With enforcement tenuous to non-existent, it is 
certain that these guidelines are of little consequence for most of China’s food 
and beverage workers. Nonetheless, the guidelines represent an important 
political development and, perhaps, recognition of the limits of 
decentralization. It is also worth emphasizing that this agreement remains 
highly exceptional, and nearly all efforts with sectoral bargaining continue to 
appear at the municipal level. 
Managerial experiments 
Human resource management (HRM) has changed dramatically in 
China over the past 30 years - and even in the past five. From the 1950s until 
the 1980s, employment in SOEs was characterized by the ‘iron rice bowl’ of 
lifetime employment. Managerial actions were explicitly politicized, and while 
there was essentially no labor market, enterprise cadres maintained a great 
deal of unchecked authority over their employees (Walder, 1983). The basic 
features of this system were unchanged in the early phases of reform (during 
the 1980s), but were now joined by alternative approaches in the burgeoning 
private sector. Foreign-owned firms in the special economic zones of the south-
east were characterized by a lawless environment and coercive management 
practices (Chan, 2001). In the small domestically owned private firms of 
Zhejiang, on the other hand, a roughly egalitarian collectivist approach 
predominated (Chen, 2008), and there was little differentiation between 
 management and employees (indeed, workers were often drawn from 
extended kin networks). Only one decade into the reform process, China’s 
managerial landscape had already become highly diversified. 
More recently, managers have been using a variety of strategies to 
respond to the challenges posed by high turnover, labor conflicts, increased 
labor costs and the changing legal environment. One trend that appears across 
various forms of ownership and sectors of the economy is the increased use of 
labor subcontracting - frequently referred to as ‘dispatch labor’ in China. In 
large, part this has been a response to the higher cost of dismissal imposed by 
the Labor Contract Law, and indeed the number of dispatch workers in China 
grew from 27 million before the law was enacted to 60 million in just three 
years (Jingji Guancha bao, 2011). It appears as if SOEs have in fact been most 
aggressive in expanding the use of dispatch labor, with some firms relying on 
dispatch agencies for up to two-thirds of their workforce (Wang, 2012). 
Managers have been attracted to dispatch labor because of the enhanced 
flexibility, reduced costs and ability to skirt regulations relating to social 
insurance, non-fixed-term contracts and severance pay. As noted above, the 
Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security recently put into effect the 
‘Provisional Regulations on Dispatch Labor’. Among other features, the 
regulations ban firms from hiring more than 10 percent of their workforce from 
dispatch agencies. With a two-year grace period, it will be of great interest to 
see how various types of firms respond to these regulations. 
On the other hand, it has been private firms that have been more 
enthusiastically expanding their use of student or intern labor. As argued by 
Smith and Chan (2014; this issue), this represents a new form of ‘constrained 
labor’ in China. It is highly constrained in the sense that technical school 
 students are frequently not given any choice over whether they will take an 
internship or where they will be placed, and they are not allowed to negotiate 
over the terms of employment. Because completion of the internship is 
required for graduation, this form of labor violates the basic principle of free 
labor. Although there are no comprehensive studies on the expansion of 
student labor, anecdotal evidence suggests that this has been particularly 
pervasive in light manufacturing. In particular, Foxconn has come under fire for 
its pervasive use of forced student labor (Chakrabortty, 2013). Student labor is 
a clear attempt to stabilize the migrant workforce in the face of massive and 
seemingly unsolvable labor turnover and shortage. 
A final approach - and one that has certainly been incorporated with 
the above methods - is an attempt to construct less coercive means of 
management. Official trade unions have long advocated a paternalistic form of 
management, as embodied most clearly in the slogan of ‘harmonious labor 
relations’, but recent indications suggest that firms are changing their 
management styles of their own accord. Choi and Peng (2014; this issue) argue 
that, in their research, ‘humanized management’ was a conscious response to 
a tightening of the labor market in the Pearl River Delta. Indicating ACFTU 
support for this approach, the official Workers’ Daily reported positively on the 
method of ‘using feelings to retain people’ among small enterprises in Zhejiang 
province (Gongren Ribao, 12 February 2014). Even Foxconn, best known for its 
harsh and militaristic style of management, turned to a softer approach 
following the string of worker suicides in 2010. In addition to holding rallies 
adorned with banners reading, ‘care for and love each other’ (BBC, 2010), the 
company hired teams of mental health counselors. As Choi and Peng (2014; 
this issue) suggest in this issue, it is not clear that rhetorical shifts in the 
 absence of significant material improvements will be sufficient to stabilize the 
workforce. Nonetheless, it is clear that both managers and the state have been 
promoting a variety of paternalistic approaches to HRM. 
Conclusion 
We have argued that China is taking an experimental and decentralized 
approach to the construction of new labor relations regimes. The articles in this 
volume exemplify experiments and developments in China. Although there 
have been a number of important national-level legislative reforms, the state 
has largely prevented the emergence of any regional - let alone national - 
efforts. As a result, much of the action has taken place at the municipal or 
enterprise level. Despite the admiration with which Chinese unionists 
frequently speak of Northern European-style centralized bargaining, in practice 
they have pursued a highly decentralized approach. ‘Experimental’ here refers 
to the fact that the central state has been tolerant of regional unions and 
employers trying out a variety of different approaches to stabilizing labor 
relations. 
Nonetheless, it is important to emphasize that this experimentation 
takes place within clearly demarcated political boundaries. First, and probably 
most importantly, is that workers do not enjoy freedom of association. Thus, 
employees are still confined by the conservative and generally ineffectual 
ACFTU, which remains subordinate to management within the firm. Second, 
there is no right to strike. Under such conditions, employers have little incen-
tive to take negotiations seriously, and there is plenty of evidence to suggest 
that little substantive bargaining occurs. Of course, strikes do happen all the 
time - but typically workers must strike simply in order to get management to 
the table. Third, any kind of cross-enterprise organization that involves workers 
 is likely to be shut down by the government for fear of fomenting social 
instability. Given these constraints, efforts by the state and union to institu-
tionalize robust labor relations will continue to face major challenges - and, 
indeed, wildcat strikes are often still the most effective way for workers to 
have their grievances addressed. 
Finally, we would like to reemphasize and problematize countervailing 
trends towards increased centralization. In a number of industries and regions 
around the country, the state and union appear to be moving away from the 
extreme individualization that characterized most of the 1990s and 2000s. 
Even if collective negotiations are expanding only at the enterprise level, this 
represents an increase in centralization over the purely individual bargaining of 
the laissez faire labor market. These tendencies might, somewhat awkwardly, 
be thought of as ‘decentralized centralization’, in the sense that this 
centralization rarely extends beyond the enterprise or municipality. Inevitably, 
movements towards centralization will bump up against the state’s political 
concerns about interest coordination and aggregation. In this sense, we see an 
emergent tension between the imperatives to institutionalize an effective 
system of labor relations, on the one hand, and the state’s political 
commitment to atomization of society on the other. 
The articles in this special issue represent starting points for a number 
of promising avenues of research inquiry. First, we are in need of more 
comprehensive studies of legal enforcement and implementation. Especially 
important here would be regional and sectoral comparisons, such that we have 
a clearer understanding of how national-level legislation is instantiated in a 
variety of contexts. Second, studies of turnover could help clarify how 
 managers and local governments have responded to persistent labor short-
ages. We do not have a solid understanding as to why China has such high 
levels of labor turnover, or what sorts of approaches might stabilize the 
workforce (short of unfree labor). Third, how have changes in the dynamics of 
labor protest affected labor relations? Will increased interest-based demands 
as well as non-wage demands result in more substantive collective 
negotiations? Finally - and we believe this is applicable to all the above - what 
are the implications for labor relations of the massive inland movement of 
labor and capital? How will social, economic and political conditions in China’s 
central and western provinces impact the development of labor relations? This 
will likely be the major story over the next decade, and thus far we are sorely 
lacking in strong empirical analyses of this new frontier. Looking further into 
the future, we will need research that examines the effect on labor markets 
and labor relations of a number of recently announced proposals, including 
changes to the birth control policy, reforms to the hukou system for smaller- 
and medium-sized cities and a rise in the retirement age. Regardless of the 
outcomes, we expect that experiments with labor relations frameworks will 
continue to proceed in a largely decentralized manner. 
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Notes 
1. It should be noted that many of these firms do have Chinese 
Communist Party branches. Nonetheless, there is little 
evidence to suggest that the central Party leadership is actively 
 involved in shaping investment or managerial decisions within 
private firms. 
2. For example, Sichuan province, historically a labor-exporting 
province, reported 1.5 positions for every job seeker following 
Chinese New Year, 2014. See Zhong Xin She, yong- gonghuang 
cong yanhai xiang neidi manyan, zhaogong qiuzhi liangnan 
quyu changtai, 13 February 2014. 
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